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FEDERAL STUDENT AID: CAN WE SOLVE A PROBLEM  
WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND? 
 
Deanne Loonin* and Julie Margetta Morgan** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is not hard to see that our nation’s student loan program is in trouble. It is 
much harder to find ways to fix it. The Bipartisan Policy Center listed the following 
failings of student debt: “Too many students rely excessively on loans to finance 
their degrees, too few borrowers can afford to repay their loans once they leave 
school, and hundreds of billions of dollars in student debt are sitting on federal 
balance sheets.”1 
A more comprehensive list would consider the program’s failure to meet the 
broader goals of the federal government’s investment in higher education, including: 
 
• Failure to improve equal access to higher education: Despite billions of 
government dollars invested in student loans, the difference in college 
graduation rates between the top and bottom income groups has widened 
by nearly 50% over two decades.2  
                                                   
* © 2018 Deanne Loonin. An attorney and advocate for student loan borrowers 
including as an attorney at the Legal Services Center at Harvard Law School’s Project on 
Predatory Student Lending. She is the former Director of the National Consumer Law 
Center’s Student Loan Borrower Assistance Project.  
** © 2018 Julie Margetta Morgan. Executive Director of the Great Democracy Initiative 
and Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute. She is the former Senior Education Counsel to Senator 
Elizabeth Warren, and former Director of Postsecondary Access and Success at the Center 
for American Progress.  
1 KENNETH MEGAN & SHAI AKABAS, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., AMERICA’S STUDENT 
DEBT EXPLOSION: UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 3 (2017), 
https://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/BPC-Higher-Education-
Americas-Student-Debt-Explosion.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B4Y-RPJL].  
2 Tami Luhby, College Graduation Rates: Income Really Matters, CNN: MONEY (Nov. 
28, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/21/news/economy/income_college/ 
index.htm [https://perma.cc/83NL-L53S]. See also ALANNA BJORKLUND-YOUNG, JOHNS 
HOPKINS INST. FOR EDUC. POLICY, FAMILY INCOME AND THE COLLEGE COMPLETION GAP 
(Mar. 2016), http://edpolicy.education.jhu.edu/family-income-and-the-college-completion-
gap/ [https://perma.cc/7WHR-KZTU] (noting that college graduation rates amongst students 
from the lowest socio-economic backgrounds are 14% compared to 60% of students from 
high-socio economic backgrounds); Charles T. Clotfelter, How Rich Universities Get Richer, 
THE CHRONICLE REVIEW, Dec. 8, 2017, at B17 (“[C]olleges have performed much the same 
role in America that they have everywhere in modern societies; to educate the children of 
the ruling upper-middle class and, in effect, to reproduce those elites.”). 
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• Failure to make college affordable for low-income students: College costs 
have continued to rise, forcing more students to turn to loans for support.3 
• Failure to meet the American economy’s need for an educated workforce: 
The nation’s $100 billion annual investment in loans to educate the next 
generation is not meeting our needs; by 2020, the United States will miss 
the mark on college-educated workers by five million.4 
 
By almost any measure used to justify the government’s investment in student 
loans—ensuring that all students have access to college, closing our country’s 
wealth and opportunity gaps, or educating young people to compete in a global 
economy—the federal student loan program is failing. Furthermore, instead of 
moving our society forward, the student loan program is setting us back, leaving 
millions of students in default and forcing others to delay buying homes, saving for 
retirement, and participating fully in our economy.5  
These failures are not evenly distributed—they fall squarely on the low-income, 
first-generation, historically underserved populations that the government was 
trying to assist in the first place. The failure to improve affordability deeply affects 
low-income families; for the lowest quintile of family income, the net price of 
attendance at a four-year public school is 64% of income, compared to 22% for 
middle income and 6% for high income.6 The burdens of taking on student loan debt 
are not evenly distributed either: African American students are far more likely to 
borrow than their white peers (70% vs. 57%), and, alarmingly, they are far more 
likely to default on those loans (49% vs. 21%).7 
                                                   
3 See COLLEGEBOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2017 7 (2017), 
https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2017-trends-in-college-pricing_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HJ7B-9EYR]. Authors’ calculations based on data from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System’s Institutional Characteristics and Student Financial 
Aid Components show that, for the lowest quintile of family income ($0-$30,000), net price 
at a public 4-year college accounts for 64% of income. See id. at 20. 
4 ANTHONY CARNEVALE ET AL., GEORGETOWN PUB. POL’Y INST.: CTR. ON EDUC. AND 
THE WORKFORCE, RECOVERY: JOB GROWTH AND EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS THROUGH 
2020 2 (2013), https://cew-7632.kxcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Recovery2020.ES 
_.Web_.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9HZ-S8TP]. 
5 See Ryan McCarthy, The Student Debt Domino Effect: The CFPB’s Rohit Chopra on 




6 Authors’ calculations based on Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System data. 
Includes both dependent and independent first-time, full-time students who are Title IV 
recipients. Low-income = $0–30,000, middle-income = $48,000–75,000, high-income = 
$110,000 and up. See NAT. CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.: INTEGRATED POSTSECONDARY EDUC. 
DATA SYS.,  https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/ [https://perma.cc/4SM9-MPEG] (last visited Apr. 9, 
2018). 
7 Ben Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American 
Borrowers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 16, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.american 
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Not surprisingly, policy wonks from across the political spectrum have weighed 
in with proposals on how to address these failures.8 With the Higher Education Act 
due for reauthorization, these proposals may get serious consideration over the next 
few years, and some may even become law. But the enthusiasm to jump in and 
provide solutions to fix the federal student loan system is premature, and experts are 
writing policy prescriptions without ever fully diagnosing the problem. We cannot 
assess or resolve the failures of the student loan program because we do not have 
sufficient information about one key facet of it: the way the program is governed 
and administered by the federal government and its contractors.  
This Article argues that we have insufficient information to fully explore the 
problems in the student loan program, and that greater transparency into the 
program’s administration is a necessary first step. Part II describes the gaps in 
existing information on student loans and the resulting gaps in policy prescriptions. 
Part III illustrates some of the available evidence suggesting that the Department of 
Education’s policies and practices may be affecting the student loan program’s 
success. Part IV argues that improved public access to information about the 
administration of the student loan program would enhance both policymaking and 
outcomes for student loan borrowers. Part V describes some of the available avenues 
for improving access to information on the student loan program, and Part VI 
considers some ways to use these tools more effectively. 
 
II.  GAPS IN EXISTING INFORMATION 
 
In the last five years, higher education policy advocates have made a concerted 
effort to improve the availability of data on the state of higher education.9 These 
efforts have focused on student characteristics, progression, and outcomes data, all 
of which are essential to understanding how students fare in college, and the role 
that colleges play in determining students’ outcomes and experiences.10 However,  
 
 
                                                   
progress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2017/10/16/440711/new-federal-data-
show-student-loan-crisis-african-american-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/3VZ6-K584]. 
8 See, e.g., BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., REIMAGINING AID DESIGN AND DELIVERY 
(RADD) REPORTS, https://postsecondary.gatesfoundation.org/areas-of-focus/incentives/ 
financial-aid/reimagining/ [https://perma.cc/3MLM-T29U] (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).  
9 See INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y, POSTSEC DATA, http://www.ihep.org/postsecdata 
[https://perma.cc/W492-54T6] (last visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
10 See JENNIFER ENGLE, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., ANSWERING THE CALL: 
INSTITUTIONS AND STATES LEAD THE WAY TOWARD BETTER MEASURES OF 
POSTSECONDARY PERFORMANCE 2 (2016), https://postsecondary.gatesfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/AnsweringtheCall.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGX6-SHQH]; AMANDA 
JANICE ROBERSON ET AL., INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POLICY, A BLUEPRINT FOR BETTER 
INFORMATION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FEDERAL POSTSECONDARY STUDENT-LEVEL 
DATA NETWORK 3 (2017), http://www.ihep.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/pubs/a_blue 
print_for_better_information_ihep.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8TY-25HX].  
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these efforts largely miss out on data and other information that would reveal the 
role that the federal government and its contractors play in the success or failure of 
student aid programs.11  
At the national level, the public has three primary sources of information about 
student loans. First, the National Center for Education Statistics (“NCES”) posts 
data from the Integrated Postsecondary Data System (“IPEDS”), which is a series of 
surveys completed by institutions to report aggregate data on their students.12 IPEDS 
offers the public a view into who gets student loans in a given year, how much, and 
the proportion of students repaying their debt, disaggregated by institution and by 
certain student characteristics.13 Second, NCES administers a set of national surveys, 
including the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study and the National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Study, which use representative samples of students to 
report data on borrowing, including cumulative debt and private loan debt, by certain 
student and institutional characteristics.14  
Finally, the Department of Education publishes some information about the 
performance of student loans on its Federal Student Aid Data Center and associated 
Federal Student Aid (“FSA”) sites.15 Through the Data Center, the public can see 
information on the volume of applications and disbursement of federal student loans, 
as well as aggregate information about the student loan portfolio, including 
breakdowns by debt size, location, school type, loan status (in school, deferred, in 
forbearance, etc.), repayment plan, and delinquency status.16 The Data Center 
includes limited information on loans by servicer, including repayment status and 
repayment plan.17 Exploring FSA’s websites can provide a bit more information 
about the administration of student loans, including customer service scores for the 
major federal student loan servicers.  
Together, these resources tell us little about how the student loan program 
actually functions. The data in these systems are fairly useful for illustrating student 
and borrower outcomes, but they do little to suggest why borrowers ended up the 
way they did, and what could be done to improve their results. The most obscure 
                                                   
11 It is important to note that this Article is not a critique of student-level data efforts. 
The authors believe these efforts are valuable and should be continued; however, the authors 
believe that these efforts miss out on critical data and information necessary to understand 
the student loan program. 
12 See JAMEY RORISON & MAMIE VOIGHT, INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POLICY, PUTTING 
THE “INTEGRATED” BACK INTO IPEDS: IMPROVING THE INTEGRATED POSTSECONDARY 
EDUCATION DATA SYSTEM TO MEET CONTEMPORARY DATA NEEDS 3 (2016), 
http://www.ihep.org/sites/default/files/uploads/postsecdata/docs/resources/putting_the_inte
grated_back_into_ipeds.pdf [https://perma.cc/DHQ8-A5JK].  
13 See id. at 6. 
14 See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, SURVEYS AND PROGRAMS, 
https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/SurveyGroups.asp?group=2 [https://perma.cc/5WUW-UGPD] 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
15 FED. STUDENT AID, DATA CTR., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/data-center 
[https://perma.cc/5RY2-K8WL] (last visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
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piece of the puzzle is the participation of the federal government and its contractors. 
Though the FSA Data Center offers some information on outcomes by servicer, there 
is not nearly enough detail to help the public understand whether servicers are 
implementing student loan policy in a way that increases borrowers’ likelihood to 
repay or to seek repayment assistance when necessary. 
Given that the data available at the state and federal level are so closely tied to 
students and institutions, it is likely not a coincidence that most of the proposed 
solutions to our student aid problems aim to change student and institutional 
behavior. Persistently high student loan delinquency and default rates are prime 
examples of this phenomenon. The most recent cohort default rate on federal student 
loans stands at 11.5%, meaning more than 11% of student loan borrowers fail to 
make payments for at least 360 days within the first three years of entering 
repayment.18 Data on loan repayment status show that the problem is bigger than 
that: about 20% of Federal Direct Loans are more than ninety days delinquent on 
their debt.19 Clearly, there is a problem with student loan repayment and default.  
The prevailing wisdom in the D.C. policy community focuses on student and 
institutional responsibility for the default problem. Policy organizations suggest 
offering more robust and timely borrower counseling and repayment options that are 
more generous, easier to understand, or more reliant on automatic payments.20 Some 
also propose giving schools more “skin in the game,” or even giving institutions 
more discretion on how they dole out student loans.21 It is possible that adjustments 
to borrower behavior and college practices will improve repayment, but these policy 
suggestions are too often based on speculation rather than sound research and 
information.  
There are other possible contributing causes of repayment and default 
problems. One often overlooked consideration is the impact of government and 
private servicers’ practices on repayment. This would seem like a logical and 
important area of inquiry given that servicers are the borrower’s primary point of 
contact. If servicer behavior is a contributing cause of the repayment and default 
                                                   
18 FED. STUDENT AID, OFFICIAL COHORT DEFAULT RATES FOR SCHOOLS, 
https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html [https://perma.cc/4HQS-
N9AD] (last visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
19 FED. STUDENT AID, DIRECT LOAN PORTFOLIO BY DELINQUENCY STATUS (2018), 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/DLPortfoliobyDelinqu
encyStatus.xls [https://perma.cc/6TCE-6M56].  
20 See BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., supra note 8. 
21 See, e.g., BETH AKERS, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, RISK-SHARING: AN EFFICIENT 
MECHANISM FOR FUNDING STUDENT LOAN SAFETY NETS (2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/risk-sharing-an-efficient-mechanism-for-funding-
student-loan-safety-nets/ [https://perma.cc/ZD3F-QVG6]; LINDSAY AHLMAN ET AL., THE 
INSTITUTE FOR COLLEGE ACCESS AND SUCCESS, A NEW APPROACH TO COLLEGE 
ACCOUNTABILITY: BALANCING SANCTIONS AND REWARDS TO IMPROVE STUDENT 
OUTCOMES (2016), https://ticas.org/sites/default/files/pub_files/ticas_risk_sharing_working 
_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C87-VU3D]. 
902 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
problem, as some limited studies conclude,22 this would suggest a completely 
different set of policy changes, centering on oversight and incentives for student loan 
servicers. 
 
III.  HOW DOES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROBLEM? 
 
The problems detailed above—failure to improve educational equity, lack of 
affordability, and poor outcomes for a substantial portion of borrowers—can have 
many causes. To date, the education policy community has focused on student, 
borrower, and institution-level solutions. But there are ample reasons to suspect that 
the federal government plays a role in these failures, and therefore should be 
considered as part of any solution. This Part will review some of the indicators that 
the federal government may be at least partly to blame for student aid’s failings. 
 
A.  Canaries in the Coal Mine 
 
The first indicator that the federal government itself is adding to the problems 
inherent in the student loan program is the series of scandals that have occurred over 
time, suggesting that the Department of Education is, at the very least, failing to 
properly oversee its lending programs. A truncated list of incidents might include 
anything from sweetheart deals to school administrators who funneled students 
toward certain lenders,23 deceptive lender marketing tactics24 to illegal interest rates 
for members of the military,25 and the failure to return millions of overpaid 
government funds.26 The scandals each produced a minor uproar and, in some cases, 
                                                   
22 AMANDA JANICE & MAMIE VOIGHT, INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y, MAKING SENSE 
OF STUDENT LOAN OUTCOMES: HOW USING REPAYMENT RATES CAN IMPROVE STUDENT 
SUCCESS 14 (2016), http://www.ihep.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/pubs/ihep_repay 
ment_rate_paper_6b.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD3F-QVG6]; COLLEEN CAMPBELL & 
NICHOLAS HILLMAN, THE ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE TRUSTEES, A CLOSER 
LOOK AT THE TRILLION: BORROWING, REPAYMENT, AND DEFAULT AT IOWA’S COMMUNITY 
COLLEGES 30–32, (2015), https://www.acct.org/files/Publications/2015/ACCT_Borrowing-
Repayment-Iowa_CCs_09-28-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TG3-4WPC]. 
23 Scott Jaschik, Loan Scandal Escalates, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 10, 2007), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/04/10/loans [https://perma.cc/5FKC-DUZY]. 
24 Jonathan D. Glater, Another Student Loan Company Settles with New York, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/03/business/03lend.html 
[https://perma.cc/4UFP-3R5N]. 
25 DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF PUB. AFF., NEARLY 78,000 SERVICE MEMBERS TO BEGIN 
RECEIVING $60 MILLION UNDER DEP’T OF JUST, SETTLEMENT WITH NAVIENT FOR 
OVERCHARGING ON STUDENT LOANS (May 28, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
nearly-78000-service-members-begin-receiving-60-million-under-department-justice-
settlement [https://perma.cc/PPJ9-JKFH]. 
26 See generally Sam Dillon, Whistle-Blower on Student Aid Is Vindicated, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 7, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/07/washington/07loans.html 
[https://perma.cc/3L4U-EE2P] (describing student loan companies’ improper collection of 
hundreds of millions in federal loan subsidies); U.S. SENATE, HEALTH, EDUC., LAB. AND 
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legislative change, but none resulted in a full-scale examination of the Department’s 
practices. These hints at broader problems in the administration of the student loan 
program are strong indicators that more work needs to be done to understand the 
government’s role in administering student loans, the effects of its practices on 
borrowers, and the incentives or other drivers that affect the government’s practices. 
 
B.  Unclear Goals, Mixed Incentives 
 
Another reason to suspect that the federal government has a role in the nation’s 
student loan problems is the fact that the program’s goals create mixed incentives. 
It may seem obvious that the success of the student loan program would be measured 
primarily by how well it serves students, but this is not the case. As a government-
sponsored, taxpayer-funded program, the student loan program is measured by both 
borrower outcomes and taxpayer outcomes. In many cases, the best outcome for a 
borrower conflicts with the best outcome for a taxpayer. For example, when schools 
defraud their students, the best result for the borrower is a full cancellation of the 
loan. But, at least in a short-sighted sense, the expense of cancellation is not in the 
taxpayers’ best interest.27 
These unclear, mixed goals are not just an implicit part of lending government 
money to students—they are explicit in the structure of FSA, the body that 
administers the student loan program. FSA is the Department of Education’s 






                                                   
PENSIONS COMMITTEE, REPORT ON MARKETING PRACTICES IN THE FEDERAL FAMILY 
EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAM, (June 14, 2007), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED497127. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/GP6L-96GW] (focusing on the preferred lender scandal and other 
marketing abuses); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF PUB. AFF., JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REACHES 
$60 MILLION SETTLEMENT WITH SALLIE MAE TO RESOLVE ALLEGATIONS OF CHARGING 
MILITARY SERVICE MEMBERS EXCESSIVE RATES ON STUDENT LOANS (May 13, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-60-million-settlement-sallie-
mae-resolve-allegations-charging [https://perma.cc/AY24-V3EG]. 
27 Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 75926, 76051 (Nov. 1, 2016) 
(“Borrowers who ultimately have their loans discharged will be relieved of debts they may 
not have been able to repay, and that debt relief can ultimately allow them to become bigger 
participants in the economy, possibly buying a home, saving for retirement, or paying for 
other expenses.”). 
28 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. OF FED. STUDENT AID, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016), 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/FY-2016-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/X5A9-XY44]. 
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performance-based organization (“PBO”) in 1998.29 The idea was to create a more 
efficient program that, in the words of former House Education Committee 
Chairman Bill Goodling, would be “run like a business” and “focus on bottom-line 
results.”30  
The potential for conflict existed from the start. What does it mean, for 
example, to focus on bottom line results in a government program that also includes 
mandatory flexible repayment options, discharges, and other types of borrower 
relief? The PBO statute lists a number of purposes for FSA, including: improving 
service to students and other participants in the student financial assistance 
programs; reducing costs of administering the programs; increasing accountability 
of the officials responsible for administering the programs; providing greater 
flexibility in the management and administration of the programs; and developing 
and maintaining timely data to ensure program integrity.31 The statute does not 
clarify which goals are most important or how to choose if, for example, limiting 
costs makes it impossible to improve services or provide mandatory relief to 
borrowers.32  
It is possible for policymakers and program administrators to pursue more than 
one goal and even to serve multiple constituencies. However, the lack of clarity 
about which goals and constituencies rank highest has contributed to the systemic 
failures and confusion in student aid policymaking and administration. It has also 
made it exceedingly difficult to measure effectiveness.  
 
C.  Limiting Costs at All Costs 
 
FSA’s frequent emphasis on the stewardship of taxpayer funds in its decision-
making also provides reason to wonder about whether it has exacerbated the failures 
of the student loan program. For example, when faced with the aftermath of closed 
fraudulent institutions, the Obama Administration’s reluctance to take on full relief, 
according to news reports, stemmed largely from wariness of the financial costs as 
well as the potential political fallout of bailing out tens of thousands of borrowers.33 
Current Education Secretary Betsy DeVos similarly cited conservation of 
                                                   
29 THE WHITE HOUSE, CREATING THE GOVERNMENT’S FIRST PERFORMANCE-BASED 
ORGANIZATION TO MODERNIZE STUDENT AID DELIVERY (October 7, 1998), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/news/pbofact.html [https://perma.cc/D3ZZ-
JQYQ]. 
30 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STUDENT FINANCIAL AID ADMINISTRATORS, IMPROVING 
OVERSIGHT AND TRANSPARENCY AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S OFFICE OF 
FEDERAL STUDENT AID: NASFAA RECOMMENDATIONS, at 1 (May 2017), 
https://www.nasfaa.org/uploads/documents/NASFAA_FSA_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
54Y2-ZVAV] [hereinafter NASFAA Report]. 
31 20 U.S.C. § 1018(a)(2) (2018). 
32 See id. 
33 Stephen Burd, Borrower’s Remorse, WA. MONTHLY (Sept.–Oct. 2017), 
http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/septemberoctober-2017/borrowers-remorse/ 
[https://perma.cc/SA54-HWF4]. 
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government funds as a primary reason for opposing full relief to defrauded students. 
Citing the cost of implementing proposed regulations, DeVos stated, “[w]hile 
students should have protections from predatory practices, schools and taxpayers 
should also be treated fairly as well.”34  
Another area in which stewardship of funds seems to trump all other interests is 
in student loan collections. FSA’s servicers employ ruthless tactics to collect on past 
due debts. In one case, FSA’s contractor blocked a bankruptcy claim by arguing that 
trips to McDonald’s constituted a “luxury” making a borrower undeserving of 
discharge.35 Government officials might argue that Congress tied their hands by 
mandating extreme collection powers like wage and tax refund garnishment, Social 
Security offsets, limits on bankruptcy, and a lack of statute of limitations.36 This 
ignores the fact that the government has discretion in the use of these powers—
discretion that it rarely chooses to employ. For example, the Department has chosen 
to instruct its contractor ECMC to pursue highly aggressive and costly litigation 
tactics even against the poorest borrowers seeking bankruptcy relief.37 Furthermore, 
the Department has consistently failed to comply with threshold legal requirements, 
including due process protections and borrower defense rights, when administering 
these collection powers.38 
The irony of all of this nickel-and-diming of distressed borrowers is that the 
federal government’s stance on collections only looks responsible. Ultimately, FSA 
is not really protecting taxpayers—at least, not as much as it could. If the Department 
of Education took a step back from its consuming focus on collection, it would see 
that the overall trends point to much bigger levers for ensuring the return on taxpayer 
dollars: better policing of low-quality schools that load students up with debt, higher 
quality servicing and counseling for borrowers, and more innovative approaches to 
funding higher education. Furthermore, increased consideration of the larger goals of 
                                                   
34 Andrew Kreighbaum, DeVos: Borrower-Defense Rule Offered ‘Free Money,’ INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/09/26/devos 
-borrower-defense-rule-offered-%E2%80%98free-money%E2%80%99 [https://perma.cc/A 
43L-ZQZ9]. 
35 Natalie Kitroeff, Loan Monitor Is Accused of Ruthless Tactics on Student Debt, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/us/loan-monitor-is-accused-of-
ruthless-tactics-on-student-debt.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/DJM6-
Q9LV]. 
36 See generally DEANNE LOONIN & PERSIS S. YU, STUDENT LOAN LAW 131–154 
(National Consumer Law Center 5th ed. 2015) (detailing the full range of Department of 
Education collection powers);  20 U.S.C. § 1091a (2018) (eliminating statute of limitations 
for government student loan collection). 
37 Kitroeff, supra note 35. 
38 See, e.g., Dieffenbacher v. DeVos, 5:17-cv-00342-VAP-KK (C.D. Ca. Feb. 23, 2017) 
(challenging Department’s failure to consider defenses to repayment raised by former 
Corinthian student in response to wage garnishment action). More information about this 
case, including updates, is available at THE LEGAL SERV’S CTR. OF HARVARD LAW SCH., 
DIEFFENBACHER V. DEVOS, http://www.legalservicescenter.org/get-legal-help/predatory-
lending-and-consumer-protection-unit/project-on-predatory-student-lending/dieffenbacher-
v-devos/ [https://perma.cc/98PD-7XY6].  
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the federal government’s involvement in student aid, like preparing for a competitive 
economy or improving access to education, would also suggest a focus on improving 
institutional gatekeeping, counseling, and servicing rather than simply preservation 
of government funds. 
 
D.  Competing Constituencies and Agency Capture 
 
The array of constituencies at FSA, many with interests at odds from both 
borrowers and taxpayers, is a significant reason to suspect that FSA plays a role in 
our student loan system’s problems. FSA, by its very nature, has multiple 
constituencies, often with conflicting needs and goals, including the colleges that 
help distribute financial aid and the servicers and debt collectors that handle loans 
in repayment. Students and borrowers are just one of the groups to whom FSA is 
accountable— and often the least powerful. This is readily apparent from FSA’s 
progress measurements in its Annual Report, which evaluate both FSA’s ability to 
serve borrowers as well as its relationship with colleges and servicing and 
collections contractors.39 Unlike students and borrowers, these other constituencies 
have their own lobbying juggernauts. 
In some cases, servicers, collectors, and colleges hardly need to hire lobbyists 
to represent their interests to the Department of Education—they can count on staff 
on the inside. Agency capture and revolving door problems exist in nearly every 
government agency, but it can be particularly acute in the world of federal student 
loans given the complexity of the programs and the close working relationship 
between FSA and its contractors.40 To give just a few examples, a number of top U.S. 
Department of Education officials in President George W. Bush’s administration 
previously had worked for student lenders or related groups.41 In May 2017, when 
the head of FSA James Runcie abruptly resigned, former private sector servicer 
official Matt Sessa took over.42 Since the beginning of the Trump Administration, 
                                                   
39 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016), 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/FY-2016-Annual-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X5A9-XY44]. 
40 “Agency capture” refers to the phenomenon of government agencies becoming 
susceptible to the influence and control of the corporate entities they are meant to regulate. 
The “revolving door” refers to the pattern of employees of regulated entities moving back 
and forth between public and private sector employment. 
41 See generally Martha Graybow, Revolving Door Eyed in Student Loan Scandal, 
BOSTON.COM (Apr. 19, 2007), http://archive.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/ 
2007/04/19/revolving_door_eyed_in_student_loan_scandal/?rss_id=Boston.com+%252F+N
ews [https://perma.ccVJ99-YZXM]. 
42 Senator Elizabeth Warren raised concerns about Mr. Sessa even before he 
temporarily took over James Runcie’s job duties. In questions submitted to the Department 
in July 2016, Senator Warren asked if the Department’s ethics office specifically prohibited 
Mr. Sessa from participating in discussions of student loan servicing in light of his prior 
employment at student loan servicer PHEAA. Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, Questions 
for the Record: ESSA Implemenations Update from the U.S. Secretary of Education on 
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Senator Elizabeth Warren and other senators have written numerous letters to the 
Department voicing concerns about high level hiring of for-profit school industry 
executives, lender executives, and others.43 
When legislators and government administrators serve the loudest and richest 
constituencies, benefits flow to private companies and schools, often at the expense 
of borrowers and students. There is a lot of money to be made from the federal aid 
system. For example, the federal government has, in recent years, paid debt collectors 
close to $1 billion annually.44 A member of the debt collection industry characterized 
the Department of Education debt collection contract as “THE most sought after 
contract within this industry.”45 It should not be a surprise that the same well-
connected companies keep winning government contract competitions. In a revealing 
2013 email exchange on a debt collection industry web forum, one participant 
discussing how to enter the government student loan debt collection market stated 
that “[g]etting student loans on contingency takes political connections, period.”46 
Another added, “You have to be a huge player in the game and have some type of 
connection to even get a piece of the pie from government backed loans.”47 
The revolving door can lead to corruption and conflicts of interest, but it can 
also more quietly undermine effective administration of government programs. As 
Steven Waldman notes in his history of the Clinton Administration’s national 
service and student aid bills, “[t]he problem with a community like higher 
education—where staff moves regularly from the Hill to the Department of Education 
to trade associations—is not corruption but, potentially, stale thinking and stasis.”48 
Waldman writes: “Objectivity in policymaking becomes more difficult. Does the 
Education Department staffer who knows he’ll be having drinks at the Front Page 
                                                   
Proposed Regulations (7/12/2016), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-7-
12_QFRs_for_ED.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TMC-Q22U]. 
43 See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren, Sherrod Brown, Richard 
Durbin, Richard Blumenthal and Sheldon Whitehouse to Dr. Julian Schmoke, Jr., Chief 
Enforcement Officer, Office of Federal Student Aid (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2017_09_05_Schmoke%20_letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K4DL-BQTP]. 
44 Shahien Nasiripour, Americans Are Paying $38 to Collect $1 of Student Debt, 
BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2017, 7:39 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
05-19/americans-are-paying-38-to-collect-1-of-student-debt [https://perma.cc/NSQ7-
NSZX]. 
45 Mark Russell, Student Loans: The ARM Industry’s New Oil Well?, INSIDE ARM (Oct. 
20, 2011, 7:57 AM), https://www.insidearm.com/blogs/arm-in-focus/00008193-student-
loans-the-arm-industrys-new-oil-w/ [https://perma.cc/4UFP-3R5N]. 
46 Looking to Move into Student Loan Collections, INSIDE ARM (Aug. 2013) (on file 
with author). 
47 Id.  
48 STEVEN WALDMAN, THE BILL: HOW THE ADVENTURES OF CLINTON’S NATIONAL 
SERVICE BILL REVEAL WHAT IS CORRUPT, COMIC, CYNICAL–AND NOBLE–ABOUT 
WASHINGTON 132 (1995). 
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that Tuesday night with the college lobbyists want to sign off on a policy that will 
hurt the organization represented by his pal near the nachos?”49  
To properly gauge the extent of industry influences at the Department of 
Education, one needs to fully understand how those influences play out. 
 
E.  Lack of Accountability 
 
For students who default on their federal loans, the accountability is 
relentless. . . . Where is that kind of accountability for Sallie Mae? 
 -Senator Elizabeth Warren, Press Release December 201350 
 
Just as the PBO structure sets the government up for failure by establishing a 
set of competing and often conflicting purposes, it also makes it easier for the 
government to evade accountability. As the National Association for Student 
Financial Aid Administrators (“NASFAA”) explained in a 2017 report, the FSA 
Chief Operating Officer and other senior leaders are not confirmed by the Senate 
nor are they accountable to students, institutions, or taxpayers.51 There have been no 
penalties or consequences for FSA despite frequent reports of noncompliance with 
statutory planning and reporting duties.52  
The NASFAA report also highlights problems with FSA’s self-assessment 
model. According to NASFAA, self-assessments are a common way to begin a 
performance evaluation, but they are usually signed off on by a person or board with 
oversight responsibility. In the case of FSA, according to NASFAA, the self-
assessments stand, “without pushback, oversight, or accountability, which too often 
easily allows the organization to excuse away failure to meet goals and targets.”53 
NASFAA concludes that while there are many talented and committed individuals 
working at FSA, “employee improvement and accountability cannot be achieved 
when failure truly isn’t an option.”54 
 
IV.  THE NEED FOR MORE INFORMATION 
 
The preceding Parts offer ample reason to suspect that the federal government 
itself plays a role in the failures of its student loan program. To fully diagnose the 
problem, however, requires more information, not only on student outcomes and 
institutional responsibility, but also on the government’s policies and practices in 
                                                   
49 Id. 
50 Press Release, Senator Warren, Senator Warren Questions Treasury and ED on 
Accountability for Sallie Mae Rulebreaking and Violations (Dec. 12, 2013), 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=245 [https://perma.cc/KWC5-EEJS]. 
51 NASFAA Report, supra note 30, at 1.  
52 Id. at 2. Although these obligations have been in statute since 1998, the Government 
Accountability Office and the Department of Education’s Office of Inspector General have 
found repeated instances of noncompliance. 
53 Id. at 5.  
54 Id. at 6. 
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the administration of student loans. For example, there needs to be more complete 
answers on how and whether factors identified here, like pressure to preserve 
taxpayer dollars, or unclear goals and mixed incentives, play out in FSA’s policies 
and practices. One should also be able to understand the effect Department of 
Education policies and practices have on borrower outcomes, and the factors that 
drive FSA behavior. 
Improved information about the processes and outcomes of the student aid 
programs will directly support better policy development, but it will also support 
policy change by influencing the work of other audiences in the higher education 
policy ecosystem. First, it will give researchers and policy experts access to data and 
information they can use to evaluate the effects of current policies and the influences 
on them, and to model potential interventions. Second, it can improve individuals’ 
ability to advocate for their rights in the student aid program by giving them 
information relevant to their own student loans, or by providing general information 
about an institution, servicer, or government process that would bear upon the 
repayment of their loans or their aid eligibility. Third, improved transparency will 
enhance accountability for the administrators of the student financial aid program 
by revealing undue influence or conflict of interest, as well as by allowing the public 
and policymakers to evaluate the efficacy of the implementation of student aid 
programs. Finally, improved transparency in federal student aid programs can 
increase participation in the policy conversation around student aid by allowing 
journalists, policymakers, and advocates to build a broader audience around issues 
like student lending, college access, and college affordability. 
The provision of private collection agency handbooks, and the Obama 
Administration’s 2010 decision to pull them from the Department of Education’s 
website, provides one example of how information can be used for both 
policymaking and borrower services—as well as the harm caused when the 
government is allowed to act in the dark.55 Although intended as a guide for 
collection agencies, the handbook was also one of the few ways in which borrowers 
and advocates could find guidance on how FSA administered key programs, such as 
loan rehabilitation.56 The information it contained helped policy advocates better 
understand how those programs were administered, and it helped attorneys working 
on behalf of borrowers better understand their clients’ rights. It had been public for 
many years, although fairly well hidden in an obscure section of the Department’s 
website. 
While writing a blog post, reporter Kim Clark called the Education Department 
to ask about updates to the handbook and according to Clark, officials there “freaked 
out.”57 They told her “that if people find out that they can negotiate a debt reduction 
                                                   
55 Ariel Wittenberg, Education Department Pulls Student Debt Collectors Guide Off 
Website, CTR FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/06/16/2644/education-department-pulls-student-debt-
collectors-guide-website [https://perma.cc/U4MW-5KW3]. 
56 DEANNE LOONIN, STUDENT LOAN LAW § 6.3.3 (National Consumer Law Center 4th 
ed. 2010) (citing to private collection agency handbook in practice guide for attorneys). 
57 Wittenberg, supra note 55. 
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of 10 percent they will hold out for it, and all sorts of things like that,” adding that 
the Department of Education tried to convince her not to publish information from 
the manual.58 After publishing her story, Clark said the “next thing I knew, the 
manual was off the site.”59 This was over seven years ago. The government has not 
only failed to put the handbook back online, they have also aggressively fought 
various groups’ efforts to get an unredacted copy of the handbook through FOIA 
requests and other advocacy.60  
Researchers and policy experts would particularly benefit from the information 
in the handbook about the collection guidelines that the government offers its 
contractors, and the financial incentive structures under which those contractors 
operate. Individual borrowers need this information to help them understand the 
rules for key programs to escape default and get a fresh start. Public access to this 
information is also critical to hold the government accountable and to ensure that 
the public policy debate is based on real information about how the programs work. 
This Article argues that more openness and transparency about student loan 
administration will improve policymaking, but, given the body of academic 
literature articulating the pitfalls and unintended consequences of government 
transparency, it is worth discussing the arguments against transparency. The push 
toward open government can be traced back to the Progressive Era of the early 
1900s—including Justice Louis D. Brandeis’ famous quote, “[s]unlight is said to be 
the best of disinfectants.”61 But much of modern transparency law is rooted in the 
post-Watergate era of the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, openness was 
seen as a bulwark against the influence of industry on government, as well as a way 
to restore trust in government.62 Since the passage of FOIA in 1968, a vein of 
scholarship developed detailing unintended consequences from open government 
policies. One subset of these negative consequences has more to do with the 
mechanism of transparency—FOIA—than the core concept of government 
openness. FOIA is deeply flawed, and some of its limitations are discussed below, 
but the failures of this mechanism do not negate the overall benefits of seeking 
greater government transparency. 
The other subset of critique deserves more careful consideration. To be clear, 
these critiques do not argue that complete government secrecy is preferable to 
openness.63 Rather, critics essentially argue to be careful about two things: the way 
                                                   
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2012) (The Department often cites this section to exclude 
production of documents that would allegedly disclose techniques and procedures for law 
enforcement investigations or prosecutions). See also New York Legal Assistance Group, 
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2017 WL 2973976 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017). 
61 Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY 10, 10 (Dec. 20, 
1913).  
62 See Sudha Setty, The President’s Question Time: Power, Information, and the 
Executive Credibility Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 247 (2008).  
63 See David Frum, The Transparency Trap: Why Trying to Make Government More 
Accountable Has Backfired, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
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that the calls for government transparency are framed, and the way they are 
implemented. First, calls for transparency can be framed in ways that are helpful to 
the cause of good governance, accountability, and curbing corporate influences. But 
when advocates call for transparency indiscriminately without tightly describing the 
proper uses of transparency, their calls can be coopted in ways that actually work 
against those noble purposes.  
For example, transparency can be hijacked to actually increase industry 
influence, by focusing on publishing information that improves company’s access 
to regulatory processes, or their competitive advantage.64 Second, critics argue that 
when transparency initiatives are implemented without regard to their effect on the 
government’s decisionmaking processes, they can have unintended consequences, 
like giving regulators an incentive to change their practices to increase secrecy, or 
bogging down administrative and regulatory procedures. 
The authors recognize these criticisms, but nevertheless argue that they are not 
relevant to the issue of transparency around student loan administration. First, this 
Article primarily deals with expanded use of existing transparency mechanisms, and 
the criticisms described here are most relevant to the addition of new mechanisms 
for transparency, or to generic calls for greater government transparency. To the 
extent that the authors argue in subsequent Parts for more affirmative disclosures, 
these critiques are taken into account and addressed as much as possible. Second, it 
is clear that transparency is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means toward greater 
accountability, smarter regulation, and more effective student aid programs. Third, 
the transparency proposed here will act as a check on undue industry influence by 
focusing on information that promotes democratic participation and accountability 
for corporate actors like loan servicers and debt collectors. Finally, though there is 
some validity to the idea that too much emphasis on openness can have unintended 
negative consequences, it is important to evaluate the functions of a particular 
agency or program when determining what constitutes “too much.” As described in 
previous Parts, the outcomes and functions of the student aid program are largely 
opaque, and therefore cannot be considered to be “transparent enough” in their 
current state.  
Further, the administration of the student aid programs—particularly the 
student loan programs—contains an inherent conflict of interest between serving 
students and borrowers well, and protecting taxpayer investments. Though federal 
law could be tweaked to clarify administrators’ responsibilities with respect to this, 
the conflict will always persist. In a case where administrators will always be 
seeking to balance the competing interests of two parties, greater transparency is a 
way to both maintain accountability and evaluate the state of the equilibrium. 
                                                   
magazine/archive/2014/09/the-transparency-trap/375074/ [https://perma.cc/S86R-6S8L]; 
Jason Grumet, When Sunshine Doesn’t Always Disinfect the Government, WASH. POST (Oct. 
2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/laws-aimed-at-transparency-have-
hindered-serious-debate/2014/10/02/7c5eb022-48dd-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html? 
wprss=rss_opinions [https://perma.cc/BG9U-KXUL].  
64 See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information 
Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1112–17 (2017).   
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V.  ACHIEVING GREATER PUBLIC INFORMATION ABOUT STUDENT FINANCIAL AID:  
THE TOOLS IN THE TOOLBOX 
 
If improved public access to information is essential to better policy and better 
outcomes, then one needs to figure out how to get that information out. This Part 
examines the transparency tools available to the public, and the ways advocates, 
researchers, and attorneys have typically used them. It also highlights the limitations 
of these approaches, and the potential for more effective measures in the future. 
Those who wish to get information on federal student aid have a number of 
tools in their toolbox, each offering benefits and limitations in equal measure. David 
Pozen’s 2017 article on the limitations of the Freedom of Information Act articulates 
a fairly comprehensive list of the ways in which the U.S. government offers 
transparency to the public; the authors adopt that list with some slight 
modifications.65 FOIA requests, affirmative disclosure, and executive branch 
monitoring have all been used to glean information from the Department of 
Education.66 This Article offers two additional pathways: ad hoc disclosure and 
disclosure pursuant to litigation. 
 
A.  FOIA Requests 
 
The Freedom of Information Act, often considered a landmark advancement of 
government transparency and a key to accountability,67 is an obvious tool for 
retrieving primary sources from government agencies. FOIA requires the 
government to respond to records requests from any person, so long as the requests 
do not fall into certain exempted categories.68 Advocates and journalists often try to 
use FOIA to access sources, like FSA handbooks described in a previous Part, to 
help those interested in either changing policy or supporting individual borrowers to 
understand the rules of the game.  
Consumer attorneys use FOIA to retrieve documents to fuel their work on 
behalf of student loan borrowers.69 FOIA is less frequently used to push for policy 
reform, but there are some notable examples. In 2016, the Center for American 
Progress and the Century Foundation used a FOIA request to the Department of 
Education to compile a set of eligibility applications, compliance audits, and audited 
financial statements from institutions applying for continued access to federal 
student financial aid to evaluate the Department’s oversight and monitoring 
                                                   
65 Id. at 1102–10.  
66 For the sake of brevity, this Article excludes whistleblowing/leaking, because it is 
not a tool that is easily leveraged by advocates. 
67 John Moon, The Freedom of Information Act: A Fundamental Contradiction, 34 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1157, 1157–60 (1985).  
68 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2016) (outlining areas exempted from the Freedom of 
Information Act). 
69 See, e.g., New York Legal Assistance Group, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Education, 
No. 15 CIV. 3818 (LGS), 2017 WL 2973976, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017). 
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structures.70 And in 2014, the National Consumer Law Center used Department of 
Education debt collector ranking and evaluation documents, as well as Better 
Business Bureau and Federal Trade Commission complaints against Department of 
Education debt collectors, to reveal flaws in the contracting and oversight 
mechanisms for student loan debt collectors.71 
For all of FOIA’s potential, it has some significant drawbacks. It puts the 
burden on the requester to know what documents or records the government has. It 
is time consuming. In cases where the government denies a request, it is expensive. 
Also, the requester has no affirmative burden to share the results of a FOIA request, 
so much of the information retrieved sits in a file cabinet rather than building our 
collective knowledge base. Finally, its exemptions—particularly those for trade 
secrets and law enforcement—make it difficult to retrieve information that pertains 
to student loan servicing and debt collection.  
 
B.  Affirmative Disclosure 
 
In some cases, either based on policy or simply historical practice, the 
government releases information affirmatively to the public. This Article cannot 
catalog all of the instances in which the Department of Education does this, but 
rather we will focus on instances in which the public has successfully pushed the 
Department to broaden its affirmative disclosures to include more useful 
information. 
Between 2014 and 2017, the Department of Education responded to pressure 
from researchers, advocates, and members of Congress who identified a gaping hole 
in the knowledge about student loans. Prior to 2014, the Department published very 
little information on the performance of the student loan portfolio, leaving the public 
with almost no insight into the performance of loans by servicer, geography, 
delinquency status, or other key characteristics.72  
In a series of updates to the FSA Data Center, the Department of Education 
began releasing broader data, including breakdowns of the student loan portfolio by 
borrower age, debt size, state, and delinquency status, as well as information on loan 
status by servicer.73 Although the release of this information was a huge step 
                                                   
70 Bob Shireman et al., Looking in All the Wrong Places: How the Monitoring of 
Colleges Misses What Matters Most, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 12, 2016 12:14 PM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/reports/2016/04/12/133263/looking-in-
all-the-wrong-places/ [https://perma.cc/HXM8-SPMJ]. 
71 DEANNE LOONIN & PERSIS YU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., POUNDING STUDENT 
LOAN BORROWERS: THE HEAVY COSTS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S PARTNERSHIP WITH DEBT 
COLLECTION AGENCIES  26 (2014), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-sl-
debt-collectors.pdf [https://perma.cc/79CQ-LKYD]. 
72 Susan Dynarski, We’re Frighteningly in the Dark About Student Debt, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/upshot/were-frighteningly-in-the-
dark-about-student-debt.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7MLA-7CP8]. 
73 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID POSTS UPDATED REPORTS TO FSA 
DATA CENTER (Mar. 17, 2016), https://ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/031716FederalStudent 
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forward, portfolio-level data is insufficient to allow researchers and policy experts 
to truly understand the health of the student loan portfolio, as well as institutions’ 
and servicers’ role in influencing student outcomes—understanding the performance 
and risks to a loan portfolio requires the ability to “slice and dice” the data, which is 
not possible with static charts.74 A group of researchers and advocates have banded 
together as the Postsecondary Data Collaborative to push for access to anonymized 
student-level (or borrower-level) data, including the release of existing data extracts 
like the Cost Estimation and Analysis Division’s Statistical Abstract (“CEAD-
STAB”), or the release of student loan data through the National Center for 
Education Statistics.75 
In some ways, affirmative disclosure is a better approach to government 
transparency than FOIA, because it reduces the burden on the public to extract 
information from the government, and it creates a culture of disclosure rather than 
secrecy. But there are some pitfalls, too. When disclosures are done based on 
administrative practice rather than a legal requirement, there is a risk that an agency 
will either change or completely reverse its practice of disclosure—particularly 
when there is a change in administration resulting from a presidential election. Even 
when Congress mandates affirmative disclosures, the resulting information may not 
be particularly useful for certain purposes. The disclosures currently mandated under 
the Higher Education Act pertaining to aggregate data may be helpful to consumers, 
and in some cases researchers, but they are not useful to borrowers seeking 
information about circumstances that are unique to their cases.  
 
C.  Executive Branch Oversight/Monitoring 
 
Pozen identifies investigations and oversight by Congress as a means of 
transparency. This investigatory category is broadened to include monitoring by 
executive branch actors that have authority to investigate federal agencies, including 
the Government Accountability Office and the Inspectors General. In some cases, 
                                                   
AidPostsUpdatedReportstoFSADataCenter.html [https://perma.cc/7FV7-BAUL]; U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID, IFAP—ELECTRONIC ANNOUNCEMENTS (Sept. 21, 
2017), https://ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/092117FSAPostsNewReportsToFSADataCenter 
.html [https://perma.cc/9FT4-Q2CH]; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID POSTS NEW 
REPORTS TO FSA DATA CENTER (Sep. 21, 2016), https://ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/0822 
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74 See, e.g., COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, LOAN 
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 29 (1998), https://www.occ.gov/ 
publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/loan-portfolio-management/pub-
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75 MATTHEW SOLDNER & COLLEEN CAMPBELL, INST. FOR HIGHER ED POL’Y, USING—
AND IMPROVING—FEDERAL STUDENT AID DATA SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT POLICY ANALYSIS 8 
(2016), http://www.ihep.org/sites/default/files/uploads/postsecdata/docs/resources/using_ 
and_improving_fsa_data_systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8JU-FUTG]. 
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rather than requesting direct access to government data or primary sources, 
advocates and policymakers have leveraged internal government investigatory 
methods to get insight into the inner workings of federal student aid. In other words, 
instead of digging around in the Department of Education’s files themselves, they 
have called upon the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the Department of 
Education Inspector General, members of Congress, or others to do the digging and 
compile reports that bring ED’s actions into the public view.  
There are many examples of this, but the oversight process around 
implementation of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”) illustrates how 
several of these oversight mechanisms can play out. In 2014, the Department of 
Justice and the FDIC reached settlements with the student loan servicer Navient over 
Navient’s alleged failure to provide interest rate reductions to service members in 
accordance with the SCRA.76  
Then Secretary Arne Duncan responded to public outcry by vowing to 
undertake his own investigation of Navient and other servicers, but just a few months 
later, the Department of Education renewed its contract with Navient without any 
investigation.77 A year after the DOJ settlement, the Department of Education finally 
released its review of Navient and other servicer’s compliance with SCRA, finding 
no wrongdoing on Navient’s part.78 The Department of Education’s review included 
some of the data used to reach those conclusions, and several Senators took the 
opportunity to review that data for themselves, reaching very different conclusions 
that raised concerns about the impartiality of the Department’s review. As a result, 
the Department of Education Inspector General reviewed the Department’s report, 
and ultimately concluded that the Department of Education had misled the public.79 
                                                   
76 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches $60 Million 
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This example illustrates both how existing congressional and administrative 
oversight vehicles can be used to get information out to the public, and also the 
pitfalls of relying on a government agency to analyze data and publicize its 
conclusions.  
 
D.  Disclosures Pursuant to Litigation 
 
Litigation affords parties the right to retrieve documents that would not 
necessarily be disclosed under FOIA or other public transparency methods. In 
addition to providing information to the attorney and clients themselves, the 
information retrieved through discovery can become public through the pleadings 
and dispositions of the cases. For example, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau’s litigation against loan servicers and for-profit colleges have yielded 
insights that would not otherwise have easily been obtained by advocates and 
policymakers.80 Though discovery allows attorneys and their clients the opportunity 
for depositions and document review that can give a glimpse into records not 
otherwise available, there are a few obvious limitations. First, litigation can be 
hugely expensive, and therefore is not a reasonable tool for transparency alone, 
without some other reason for pursuing the case.81 Second, in many instances, a 
judge might issue a protective order prohibiting the party from publicizing the 
documents obtained through discovery, making it impossible to use the information 
for anything other than the litigation itself.  
 
E.  Ad Hoc Disclosure 
 
With all of these formal methods of retrieving information from the 
government, it is easy to forget that one can simply ask for information from a 
government official. There are many instances in which the government has no 
affirmative requirement to disclose information to the public, but it also does not 
have any restrictions keeping it from doing so. Those with access to decision makers 
at the Department of Education can simply request information and receive it. One 
example is the disclosure of outstanding student loan volume by interest rate to the 
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Center for American Progress (“CAP”) in 2013.82 This information was not 
available on Department of Education’s FSA data center, and the Department did 
not make it available to other organizations. CAP did not have to go through the 
rigorous process of a FOIA request—all it had to do was ask. The limitations to this 
tool are plain to see: it depends upon the Department’s willingness to assist, and the 
power of the requester’s network.  
Taken together, these tools and tactics hold enormous promise for uncovering 
information about the administration of the student loan program, including better 
data on how borrowers fare; insight into the oversight of colleges, servicers, and 
collectors that participate in the program; information about college, servicer, and 
collector policies and practices; and information on the primary actors who influence 
the behavior of players in the student loan system. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
At over $1 trillion, with more than 8 million borrowers in default, the federal 
student loan program is in trouble. There is no question that policymakers will do 
their best to fix it in the coming years. The only question is whether they will have 
the evidence they need to make informed judgments about what ails our student loan 
program, and what can cure it.  
The publicly available evidence at this point is insufficient to fully understand 
the way that the federal government oversees and implements the student loan 
program, and what, if any, role the government has in determining the success or 
failure of the program. The limited information available on both the structure and 
the practices of FSA suggest that there is substantial reason to suspect that reforms 
to the administration of student loans are a necessary precondition to fixing the 
student loan program.  
In the coming years, advocates, policymakers, and researchers should focus on 
gathering data and information on all possible causes of the failures in the student 
loan program. As the previous Part describes, the public has a number of tools at its 
disposal to procure more data and information. Individual organizations may, of 
course, use these tools on their own, but there are compelling reasons to think more 
broadly.  
By pooling their capacity to make requests and sharing the results, advocates 
and researchers can move toward a broader base of information for the entire higher 
education policy field. A collective effort toward improved information on the 
student loan program might include a narrow set of “research” questions—or areas 
of inquiry—that organizations will pursue together, and an independent repository 
that stores the results of these inquiries in an easily searchable format. 
 
                                                   
82 ANNE JOHNSON & TOBIN VAN OSTERN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, IT’S OUR 
INTEREST: THE NEED TO REDUCE STUDENT LOAN INTEREST RATES 11 (2013), 
https://www.scribd.com/document/125302109/It-s-Our-Interest-The-Need-to-Reduce-
Student-Loan-Interest-Rates [https://perma.cc/6BRQ-X2U4]. 
